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Abstract 
In modern U.S. agriculture, there are numerous trade-offs between 
agricultural and chemical policies. This study provides an empirical 
context for general observations of trade-offs between commodity policies 
designed to stabilize income and chemical policies that affect the 
availability and prices of chemical inputs. Four examples of policies 
involving trade-offs between agricultural and chemical policies are 
reviewed. These illustrate conservation compliance, taxation of 
commerci~l nitrogen, targeting of conservation reserve enrollment, and 
banning of corn rootworm insecticides. 
Generally, these analyses showed that environmentally motivated 
changes in agricultural production patterns and practices could be 
accommodated in U.S. agriculture with relatively modest increases in 
production costs. Results indicate considerable opportunity for bringing 
agricultural price and income stabilization policy mechanisms into closer 
harmony with environmental policy. Clearly, outcomes from linked policies 
are highly conditioned by the market supply/demand situation as well as 
the agricultural policy framework. The argument, then, is for flexible 
policies and a recognition that settings of policy instruments for 
policymakers will require adjustment as the factors conditioning 
agriculture and the environment change. 
Introduction 
Modern U.S. agriculture entails numerous trade-offs between 
agricultural and chemical policy. Chemicals are major inputs in 
agricultural production processes for both crops and livestock; however, 
their negative environmental side affects are not entirely accounted for in 
private-sector usage decisions (Benbrook 1988). Agricultural policies are 
primarily designed to stabilize commodity prices and enhance farm income, 
which in turn change production levels, provide incentives for different 
intensities of factor use, and influence the loading of chemicals. In 
turn, chemical policies--e.g., taxes, use restrictions, and 
registration--by changing the availability and prices of chemical inputs, 
alter agricultural production and cost levels and affect agricultural 
income. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical context for these 
very general observations on trade-offs. To do so, the dimensions of the 
discussion are narrowed. First, for agricultural policy, the review is 
limited to crops and, more particularly, to commodity policy derived from 
farm bill legislation. Chemical policies investigated will relate to 
authorities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to regulations 
emerging in states, and to supply control provisions of farm bill 
legislation. Four examples are used for illustration: conservation 
compliance, taxation of commercial nitrogen, targeting of conservation 
reserve enrollments, and banning of corn rootworrn insecticides. 
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In the discussion to follow, the issue of trade-offs between 
agricultural and chemical policies is first discussed relative to the 
current agricultural supply and demand situation, One observation that 
emerges involves the opportunity for win-win situations in regulation when 
agricultural policies incorporate supply control measures. Also, the 
linking of agricultural and chemical policy can force or encourage certain 
forms of trade-offs. But, the outcomes for these tied provisions are 
highly dependent on the commodity supply-demand situation, the availability 
of alternative production technologies, and the restrictiveness of the 
supply control provisions. Next, the four examples of policies involving 
trade-offs between agricultural and chemical policies are reviewed. 
Generally, the empirical findings are from research by the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD). And, they involve comparisons 
between a baseline and selected policy options. Last, some general 
observations are drawn on orders of magnitudes of the trade-offs between 
agricultural and chemical policy. 
Trade-Off Opportunities 
Ideas for exploiting opportunities for trade-offs between agricultural 
and chemical policy received increased attention in the debate leading to 
the Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA85). In the FSA85, broad environmental 
provisions were for the first time tied to agricultural commodity titles 
(Glaser 1986), The agricultural situation during the FSA85 debate was one 
of high excess productive capacity at government-supported prices, high 
stocks relative to historical stocks/use ratios, and the necessity to idle 
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significant productive resources to control government cost and stocks. In 
this type of setting, agricultural and environmental win-win policy 
possibilities do exist (Dvoskin 1988). First, a reduction of government 
intervention in the commodity markets could be achieved. It has been 
argued that if all farm support programs were eliminated, the resulting 
crop mix--though expanded in acreage--would be more beneficial to the 
environment (Phipps and Reichelderfer 1989). Second, the excess supply 
could be reduced, providing gains for program costs and the environment 
without significant changes in prices and government cost. 
Environmental measures enacted as part of FSA85 included the 
conservation reserve, conservation compliance, the swamp buster, and other 
provisions that achieved increased environmental quality while not 
significantly altering farm income and government costs of operating the 
farm program. Commodity policy changes consisted of a gradual lowering of 
supported prices and a freezing of base acres and yields on which subsidies 
are paid. Of course, the EPA has influenced environmental and agricultural 
trade-offs by registering or deregistering a number of agricultural 
chemicals. In many cases, substitutes for these chemicals have been 
available at only slightly higher costs. 
Since the FSA85, a number of developments have occurred that suggest 
even closer attention to trade-offs between agricultural and chemical 
policy: among them, state environmental legislation, standard setting by 
EPA, and prospects for the 1990 Farm Bill. First, residuals of 
agricultural chemicals used in crop production have been found in 
groundwater and surface water at levels suggesting health and environmental 
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risk (Nielsen and Lee 1987). This and related information on food safety, 
applicator risk, and other negative externalities from chemical use have 
directed attention to new alternatives for regulating chemicals and 
chemical loading in the agricultural/environmental system. Also, states 
have become more heavily involved in the regulation of agricultural 
chemicals (Batie and Diebel 1989; Wise and Johnson 1989). Recent bills for 
Iowa and California are examples of these initiatives. A clear implication 
is increased attention by the public to effects of current agricultural 
practices on the environment (Batie 1986). At the same time, changes in 
market conditions and existing policy frameworks have reduced the region 
within which public decision makers are able to balance agricultural and 
environmental policy. 
The situation as work begins on the 1990 Farm Bill differs in several 
respects from the one that conditioned the environmental/agricultural 
legislative dialogue in the FSA85. Generally, these differences will be 
reflected in higher market prices for agriculture, lower government 
outlays, lower participation in commodity programs, fewer idled acres 
through farmer participation in commodity programs involving supply 
control, and more public concern for agricultural-related environmental 
problems. Also, by 1990, 40 million acres of highly erodible land will be 
included in the conservation reserve. The implication is that there will 
be fewer opportunities for easy win-win interventions in agricultural/ 
chemical policy. The coordination of agriculture and chemical policies 
necessary to achieve mutually desirable policy outcomes will require 
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added sophistication, information, and management skill on the par~ of 
producers and policymakers. 
The agricultural supply and demand situation determining potential 
trade-offs between agricultural and chemical policies is suggested by 
Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, planted acreage for major program crops 
covered by the FSA85 is plotted historically, along with conserva:ion 
reserve acreage, and annual idled acreage. The figure also incluc2s 
projections th"ough 1997, made by assuming economic conditions worldwide 
will remain generally similar to those experienced in 1988. An additional 
set of assumptions underlying the projections is that the 1990 Farm Bill 
will essentially continue the provisions of the FSA85 (e.g., frozen target 
prices, acreage reduction measures, voluntary participation in commodity 
programs) and that policies of major competitors in international c.arkets 
will remain similar to those of 1988. 
Figure 1 shows that even in the near term, annual idled acreage will 
be considerably smaller than in the immediate past, especially since the 
initiation of the FSA85. These numbers of idled acres, of course, involve 
only program crops. Also, the projections for planted and idled acres 
implicitly incorporate assumptions about technical change. These 
qualifications aside, a situation is suggested in which market prices will 
be closer to target prices, participation in commodity programs will be 
lower, program-idled annual acreage will be lower, and in general, the 
distorting impacts of government commodity policy will be reduced for 
domestic and international markets. 
Figure 1. U.S. total crop acres 
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Figure 2 plots acreage idled in government programs (annual and long 
term), acreage harvested, acreage used for crops, and total acreage used 
and idled. Note that for the historical period shown, which spans a wide 
range of demand and supply conditions, the total amount of cropland has 
risen only slightly; while the proportion of idled acreage tied up in the 
long-term government reserve has grown. There is, in effect, a fairly 
tight cropland base in the United States. Added restrictions could 
increase costs of agricultural production. As Dvoskin (1988) noted, past 
subsidies may have resulted in land use above the efficient level. Another 
study (Atwood et al. 1989) has found that a reduction of the land use 
distortions associated with current programs would have greater 
environmental benefits than several of the polices currently being 
considered. 
Commodity policies are motivated primarily by concerns for maintenance 
and stabilization of agricultural income. From Figure 3, gross farm 
receipts are expected to increase from current levels modestly in the 
near term. Although livestock demand is relatively flat, market prices for 
crops are increasing (causing reductions in government cost), leaving gross 
receipts relatively constant. However, net farm income is projected to 
decrease, largely on the basis of inflation-driven input cost increases and 
flat gross receipts. And, government costs are decreasing because of lower 
participation rates in commodity programs and higher commodity prices 
(resulting in lower deficiency payments). 
Falling net farm income in the out-periods will make it difficult for 
agricultural interest groups to accept chemical policies that significantly 
111 
'-
0 
0 
0 
c 
0 
= 
m 
Figure 3. Total form receipts and net form mcome 
200 
190 
180 
170 
160 
150 
140 
130 
120 
1 1 0 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
7 1 73 
0 T otol 
Source: FAPRI 
75 77 
Crop 
(1989). 
79 81 83 
Yeor 
rm 
85 87 89 9 1 93 A 94-97 
Gov't Payments 
10 
increase costs of agricultural production. These indicators of the supply-
demand condition for agriculture describe in part a more constrained 
situation for chemical policy. Still, the EPA is likely to continue 
reviewing registration for major insecticides and herbicides, and to 
proceed with the establishment of water quality standards. State-level 
policies will tax and restrict the use of agricultural chemicals. 
Increased concerns about concentrations of nitrates in ground- and surface 
water will stimulate federal and state action. And, there will be 
significant pressure by environmentalists for chemical and water quality 
titles in the 1990 Farm Bill (Benbrook 1988). 
In short, the agriculture and environmental situation as we enter 
the 1990s suggests more difficult decisions on trade-offs between 
agricultural and chemical policy. Commodity management policies will idle 
fewer acres, giving less room for complementarities in control of chemical 
loading and risk and agricultural income. 
Selected Examples of Policy Trade-Offs 
The following examples illustrate trade-offs between agricultural and 
chemical policy and are based on research undertaken during the past year 
by CARD. Of course, other research has contributed importantly to the 
empirical information available in this area. The examples included were 
selected primarily on the basis of familiarity with the procedures used and 
the results. 
In reviewing the outcomes of the policy exercises, the emphasis is on 
results. Detailed discussions of the analytical models, the policy 
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specifics, and other features of the analysis are contained in the 
referenced reports/publications. Brief background information is provided 
here in the material preceding the empirical results for each policy 
evaluation, in which the policy alternative is outlined and the baseline 
against which the policy outcome is compared is discussed. Also, the 
analytical system is identified and the introduction of the policy 
alternative of interest is reviewed. In many cases, these latter features 
for policy analysis exercises are keys to the results and their 
interpretation. 
Conservation Compliance 
The FSA85 included conservation compliance for participants in 
agricultural commodity programs. This stipulates that farmers 
participating in the commodity programs must be in compliance with 
conservation provisions by the early 1990s. Since the development of the 
legislation, conservation compliance has been specialized to states 
(alternative conservation systems published in technical guidelines). 
Generally, conservation compliance implies adjustments in cultivation 
practices and rotations, as well as potential shifts in regional production 
patterns. Also, in light of existing production technologies, conservation 
compliance may have important implications for chemical use. 
Analysis. The analysis of conservation compliance was conducted with 
the CARD/ARIMS model (Atwood et al. 1989). The model was calibrated for 
1990 using exogenous national and export demands estimated from CARD/FAPRI 
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projections (FAPRI 1988). It must be noted that this analysis did not 
include consideration of the impacts of the 1988 drought. The ARIMS model 
uses a cost minimization criteria and does not explicitly incorporate 
commodity program participation rates. Thus, for the analysis, 
conservation compliance was assumed mandatory. 
The comparison of the conservation compliance options was to a 1990 
baseline. Yields, land available for cropping, and demand (domestic and 
export) were at levels predicted for 1990. Choices of alternative crop 
rotations, tillage methods, conservation practices, and livestock 
production practices, are modeled by ARIMS, by region, and determined 
endogenously. Key external conditioning factors used in the analysis are 
summarized in Table 1. A 45-million-acre conservation reserve was assumed 
for all policy scenarios. 
The ARIMS model also includes regional flexibility constraints that 
reflect acreage bases for major program commodities, irrigation, and 
conservation structures. The policy analysis was based on a comparison of 
long-run equilibria for the baseline and different conservation compliance 
limits of 5 and 10 tons of allowable soil loss per acre, per year (1T and 
2T, respectively). No attempt was made to describe the path from the 
current situation to the outcomes suggested by the solution of the 
model. 
Results. Results of the analysis are summarized in Table 2 (Atwood 
et al. 1989). These results are organized by erosion, land use, total 
production cost, variable input cost, tillage practice, conservation 
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Table l. Key external or conditioning factors for national model S? 
evaluations of conservation compliance scenarios 
Final Demanda,b Yield Increasec,d 
External Variable (1000 units) (Percent/Yr) 
Wheat 2,343,000 bu 2.28 
Soybeans 1,940,761 bu 2.65 
Corn 7,943,000 bu 1. 89 
Corn silage 1. 89 
Barley 543,000 bu 1. 89 
Oats 405,000 bu 1. 89 
Peanuts 46,050 bu 
Sorghum 805,000 bu 1. 89 
Sorghum silage 1. 89 
Beef 446,700 cwt 
Pork 239,800 cwt 
Cotton 15,210 bales 1. 01 
Hay 1. 02 
asum of domestic demand, feed demand, and exports. 
bTaken from "Proposed Program for CARD/FAPRI Outlook and Policy Review." 
cAverage percent ?er year for 1982-1990 period. Calibrated for most 
probably yield from 1985 Resources Conservation Act. 
~aken from The Second RCA Appraisal. Soil, Water, and Related Resources 
on Nonfederal Land in the United States. Analysis of Condition and 
Trends. (USDA 1987) . 
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Table 2. National estimates for impacts of conservation compliance 
alternatives 
Erosion 
Sheet+ Rill (ton/ac.) 
Wind (ton/ac.) 
Per Ac. Total (ton/ac.) 
Reg. Total (mil. ton) 
Land Use 
Cropped land (mil. ac.) 
corn 
wheat 
soybeans 
cotton 
nonlegume hay 
Total Prod. Cost (mil. SJ 
Crop cots (mil. SJ 
Livestock costs (mil. $) 
Transportation (mil. SJ 
Variable Inputs 
Nitrogen use (1,000 tons) 
Pesticide cost (mil. $) 
Tillage Practices 
Fall plow (1,000 ac.) 
Spring plow (1,000 ac.) 
Cons. Tillage (1,000 ac.) 
0-Tillage (1,000 ac.) 
Conservation Practices 
Straight row (1,000 ac.) 
Contour row (1,000 ac.) 
Strip cropping (1,000 ac.J 
Terracing (1,000 ac.) 
Baseline a 
3.50 
3.80 
7.40 
2,141.90 
318. 10 
69.70 
55.90 
49.00 
11.70 
34.66 
56,228.00 
34,267.00 
21,960.00 
3,871.00 
8,873.00 
3,769.00 
51,068.00 
125.791.00 
95,436.00 
17,735.00 
257,084.00 
4,439.00 
1,304.00 
27,303.00 
Erosion Limits (tons/ac.)b 
10 5 
(percent difference from base) 
-31.9 
-33.7 
-32.8 
-32.4 
0.5 
0.0 
1.8 
-0.9 
-4.0 
-2.4 
2.2 
3. 7 
0.0 
-1.9 
0.2 
6.9 
0.6 
0.2 
1.4 
-1.2 
-11.3 
187.2 
1,800.0 
-4.3 
-43,9 
-46.2 
-45. 1 
-44.9 
0.3 
-1.5 
-1.4 
1.8 
-7.2 
1.1 
3.9 
6.5 
0.0 
0.3 
5.6 
11.7 
-19.2 
7.2 
2.1 
-1.9 
-21.0 
378.3 
3,043.3 
-5.9 
SOURCE: Agricultural Resources Interregional Modeling System (ARIMSJ, 
CARD. 
aBaseline refers to ARIMS projected 1990 scenario with a 45-million-acre CR 
(baseline), no limits on allowable soil loss, and FAPRI (1988) demands. 
bThe 10- and 5-ton erosion limit refer to ARIMS projected 1990 baseline 
comparison and annual limits on per acre soil loss for conservation 
compliance. 
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practice. :o~ the present discussion, the emphasis is on erosion levels, 
chemical and :ertilizer costs, and production costs. 
Fertilizer expenditures increased nationally with imposition of both 
conservation compliance standards. Nitrogen fertilizer use increased by 
5.6 percent for the 1T conservation compliance standard. Pesticide 
expenditures increased 6.9 and 11.7 percent above the baseline for the 2T 
and lT standards, respectively. Some of the estimated increase in 
pesticide use resulted from expanded cropped acres, but most was associated 
with a shift to conservation tillage. The increase in nitrogen use was 
related to the cultivation of lower-quality land, which required higher 
nitrogen inputs. Also, the kinds of crop rotations used to meet 
conservation compliance leave more organically produced nitrogen in the 
system that is unused by row crops. 
Total erosion was reduced by 45 and 32 percent for the 1T and 2T 
standards, respectively. Associated increases in total production costs 
were 3.9 and 2.2 percent. Total land use increased 0.3 and 0.5 percent 
above the baseline for the 1T and 2T standards. For most regions, the 
erosive impact of the higher levels of land use was more than off-set by 
tillage practices that reduced per acre erosion levels. Because final 
demands were fixed, the only possible changes in commodity production 
levels involved intermediate inputs and a few cases of overproduction that 
resulted when specific crop rotations were required to meet erosion 
abatement standards. 
Of course, qualifications are in order for analyses with such highly 
restrictive models. First, it is emphasized that the conservation 
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compliance standards were mandatory and that current policies based on 
individual state technical guidelines were not specifically evaluated. 
But, from a review of these guidelines, the 2T criteria for minimizing soil 
loss appears to be a reasonable approximation of how the program currently 
is being implemented. Second, production cost increase estimates probably 
are high. Simply put, farm operators are smarter and more resourceful than 
can be captured by the rigid budgets in ARIMS. Third, soil loss 
restrictions were estimated using the universal soil loss equation (USLE) 
(Wischmeier and Smith 1978), which includes a significant level of error 
for both water-induced erosion and wind erosion (Smith and English 1982). 
However, the results demonstrate that even a relatively modest mandatory 
restriction on soil loss--2T, for example--can result in major reductions 
in erosion rates and relatively small increases in production costs and 
costs overall. Tighter standards, such as the 1T level, increase costs 
more than proportionately. 
Nitrogen Tax 
Nitrate levels in potable water sources that imply risk to human 
health have been widely detected in the U.S. (Nielsen and Lee 1987). One 
alternative for limiting the use of nitrogen is a tax (Swanson 1982). To 
date, such taxes have been relatively small (Iowa House of Representatives 
1987). And, important questions remain on the likely national impacts of 
taxes on nitrogen and other chemicals on input use, water quality, 
agricultural income, crop production patterns, and other indicators of 
environmental and agricultural performance. Results of this exercise were 
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intended to provide information for assessing possible consequences of a 
national nitrogen tax. 
Analysis. The analysis was of a five-cent nitrogen tax. The 
analytical system used was ARIMS. The ARIMS model for the nitrogen tax 
exercise was conditioned using the same external factors as for the 
conservation compliance analysis. Also, to incorporate the effects of the 
nitrogen tax, input use coefficients for each productive activity in the 
model were adjusted to reflect the increased relative cost of nitrogen. 
These input levels were adjusted using a simple yield/fertilizer response 
function (English, Alt, and Heady 1982). In the ARIMS model, nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and potassium are applied in fixed proportions, so the 
adjustments in nitrogen implied similar adjustments in other fertilizer 
inputs. As for the conservation compliance evaluation, only the regional 
crop acreage flexibility constraints incorporated in ARIMS reflected 
government commodity program parameters. 
Modeling the effects of the tax with ARIMS required two steps. First, 
under the assumption of profit maximization, each alternative production 
activity in ARIMS had fertilizer/yield coefficients adjusted to reflect the 
relative price changes associated with the tax. Secondly, under the 
assumption of movement to a new long-run competitive equilibrium, 
optimization procedures were used to determine national production, 
feeding, transportation, and consumption levels consistent with the tax. 
Changes in reported aggregate fertilizer from the ARIMS solution may arise 
from three sources: (1) changes in fertilizer/yield relationships on an 
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individual crop acre basis, (2) changes in crop rotations to take advantage 
of legume fixed nitrogen carryover and changes in manure production and 
applications, and (3) changes in high-nitrogen-demanding cropping patterns, 
with accompanying changes in crop utilization patterns. 
Results. The five-cent nitrogen tax represented an approximate 20 
percent increase in the nitrogen price as imposed in the ARIMS budgets; the 
baseline nitrogen price varied by region but was between 22.5 and 27.5 
cents per pound. In general, as a result of the optimization calculations 
(external to ARIMS) using the fertilizer crop yield response functions, 
nitrogen use was reduced by approximately 5 percent and yields changed 1-2 
percent. Results of the analysis are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. In 
addition to these results, the ARIMS solution provides information on 
impacts for non-nutrient input use, soil erosion, tillage practices and 
crop rotations, livestock production, and producer and consumer welfare. 
Tables 3 and 4 address only fertilizer application and production costs 
compared to the baseline. 
At the national level, per acre nitrogen use declined 10 percent. 
Regional changes were between 4 and 13 percent, depending on the region. 
(Table 3). Since N, P, and K are used in fixed proportions, similar 
adjustments were observed for other chemical inputs. These reductions in 
applied nitrogen were offset by about one-half by legume-produced nitrogen. 
From this analysis, the increase in legume production was 2.5 percent 
nationally. This would imply that approximately one-half of the 
substituted legume-based nitrogen was already residing within the system as 
a result of crop rotations. Thus, in total, nitrogen used by crops was 
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Table 3. Impact of nitrogen tax on nutrient applications (percentage 
change from baseline) 
Northeast 
Appalachia 
Southeast 
Delta 
Corn Belt 
Lake States 
Northern Plains 
Southern Plains 
Mountains 
Pacific 
National 
National basea 
Nitrogen 
Total 
5.8 
-7.9 
-4.3 
-7.2 
-9.8 
-8.4 
-13.2 
-11.9 
-9 .o 
-5.4 
-9.4 
8,040.0 
Per 
Acre 
-3.7 
-7.4 
-4.0 
-8.8 
-10.8 
-8.4 
-13.2 
-11.9 
-9.3 
-6.3 
-10. 1 
50.0 
Phosphorous 
Total 
ll.8 
-3.8 
-4.0 
-5.4 
-4.2 
-3.6 
-11.1 
-11.1 
-5.0 
-2.2 
-3.4 
4,184.0 
Per 
Acre 
1.7 
-3.3 
-3 .8 
-7.0 
-5.2 
-3.6 
-11. 1 
-ll.O 
-5.3 
-3.0 
-4.2 
26.0 
Potassium 
Total 
11.6 
-4.9 
-3.1 
-5.4 
-4.5 
-6.7 
-11.8 
-9.9 
-5.9 
-2.2 
-5.9 
2,829.0 
?er 
Acre 
1.5 
-4.4 
-2.8 
-7.0 
-5.5 
-6.7 
-ll. 8 
-9.8 
-6.2 
-3. 1 
-6.6 
18.0 
SOURCE: Atwood, Jay Dee, and S. R. Johnson. 1990. "The Potential for 
'LISA'-Type Nitrogen Use Adjustments in Mainstream U.S. 
Agriculture." CARD Working Paper 90-WP 49 (also forthcoming in 
Journal for Soil and Water Conservation). Center for Agricultural 
and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
aBaseline quantities are thousands of tons. 
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Table 4. I"'pact of nitrogen tax on output price index (percentage change 
from baseline) 
Crops Livestock 
Northeast 13 .1 0.8 
Appalachia -0.1 0.6 
Southeast -0.5 -0.2 
Delta 2.1 2. 1 
Corn Belt 0.9 1.9 
Lake States 0.2 4.0 
Northern Plains 0.0 0.2 
Southern Plains 1.3 5.1 
Mountains 0.9 0.0 
Pacific 0.5 0.4 
National 1.3 0.0 
SOURCE: Atwood, Jay Dee, and S. R. Johnson. 1990. "The Potential for 
'LISA'-Type Nitrogen Use Adjustments in Mainstream U.S. 
Agriculture." CARD Working Paper 90-WP 49 (also forthcoming in 
Journal for Soil and Water Conservation). Center for Agricultural 
and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
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down about 5 percent, and excess nitrogen in the system was reduced by 
about one-half as a result of tax-induced changes in rotation choices. 
Major differences were observed by production region, with the largest 
reductions in total in the Northern and Southern Plains. Generally, these 
were due to changes in cropping practices and--in the Southern Plains--the 
use of rotations that involve increased cropping intensity. For other 
inputs, the choices implied by the tax resulted in production increases 
(Atwood and Johnson 1989). For most regions, pesticide application rates 
increased, as did machinery and labor inputs. These resulted from shifts 
to more intensive cropping. 
Output price indices are constructed for crops and livestock under the 
assumption that price equals marginal cost (at the fixed demand levels) ; 
baseline quantity weights also were assumed. Results for these price 
indices, nationally and by region, are provided in Table 4. They are 
expressed as percentage changes from the baseline and are designed to 
provide an indication of the impact of the nitrogen tax on production 
costs. At the national level, there was only a 1.3 percent increase in the 
crop price index and no change in the livestock price index. Most regional 
impacts were relatively small, except for the 13.1 percent crop price 
increase in the Northeast and increases of livestock prices by 4.0 and 5.1 
percent in the Lake States and Southern Plains, respectively. 
Hence, although there were regional implications of the nitrogen tax, 
the overall national impact on crop production costs and implied changes in 
market prices of agricultural commodities associated with the five-cent 
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nitrogen tax was estimated to be relatively small. Possibly the most 
interesting result from the analysis for the nitrogen tax involved the fact 
that given the model structure, the increase in nitrogen price resulted in 
more efficient use of organic nitrogen in crop production. This, together 
with the lower use of nonorganic nitrogen, would imply a reduced loading of 
nitrates in ground- and surface water. 
Targeting the Conservation Reserve 
The conservation reserve authorized by the FSA85 encourages farmers to 
idle highly erodible cropland and other land that meets eligibility 
criteria, and to convert it to permanent vegetative cover. Under current 
provisions, two criteria designate cropland as highly erodible: an 
erodibility index equal to or greater than eight for wind or water erosion, 
or an erosion rate greater than that recommended by SCS field technical 
standards based on soil loss tolerance. For the erodibility criteria, at 
least two-thirds of a field must be considered highly erodible and must 
have been cropped between 1981 and 1985 for eligibility in the conservation 
reserve (USDA 1987). 
The conservation reserve analysis reported illustrates the possibility 
of enhancing environmental benefits by targeting (Frohberg et al. 1989). 
The objective was to evaluate targeting a portion of the conservation 
reserve to land adjacent to water bodies, flowing streams, and river 
waterways. These lands are termed buffer or filter strips. Within the 
conservation reserve program, significant potential exists for enhanced 
environmental benefits beyond erosion abatement by changing targeting 
criteria. The rationale is that buffer strip lands removed from crop 
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production will act to limit waterway sedimentation and filter upland 
erosion material with associated pollutants from runoff before the runoff 
reaches waterway channels. Buffer strips of 100 feet in width were assumed 
for the analysis. 
Analysis. The analytical system used for evaluation of the buffer 
strip targeting was the Comprehensive Economic Environmental Policy 
Evaluation System (CEEPES), developed by CARD under contract with EPA. 
Essentially, CEEPES is a suite of process and economic models that includes 
components for agricultural decisions, biogeophysics, health risk, and 
policy interaction (Johnson et al. 1989). For the targeting, a reduced 
version of CEEPES was applied, emphasizing the agricultural decision 
component. Specifically, national market-level models and state-level 
profit maximization models for the upper Mississippi River basin were 
used. 
The baseline for the multimarket commodity models was from 1988 prior 
to the drought (FAPRI 1988), The results reported are for a targeting of 
five million acres of the 45-million-acre conservation reserve to buffer 
strips. The analysis required detailed calculations of land available for 
buffer strips. Because there are essentially no national-level data 
available on acres of land adjacent to water bodies, flowing streams, and 
river waterways, these data had to be synthesized from a number of sources 
(Frohberg et al. 1989). Also, analytical methods were necessary to 
estimate the amount of land eligible for buffer strips already in the 
conservation reserve or in lands under public control. Needless to say, 
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these estimation methods were not without fault. But, the exercise 
highlighted the scarcity of information available for environmental 
targeting of the conservation reserve. 
Results. Results of the exercise evaluating targeting of the 
conservation reserve are provided in Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, market 
price implications of the targeting are identified for major progr&~ crops 
and projected through 1991/92. The important figures are the changes from 
the base. Estimation of these differences is more reliable than the 
estimation of the levels. Generally speaking, five million of the 
45-million-acre reserve could be targeted to buffer strips without 
significantly affecting agricultural commodity prices. The major change 
observed, albeit small, involved cotton and small grains. This is because 
the targeting shifted conservation reserve enrollment to the Corn Belt from 
the plains and southern states. With commodity program provisions 
remaining the same between the targeted alternative and the baseline, 
increased acreages for these crops were estimated, resulting in slight 
reductions in prices. 
Results not shown indicated that the government costs associated with 
the targeting were minimal under the market situation in 1988. Shifting 
the conservation reserve to the Midwest increased rental rates but in turn 
decreased deficiency payments, which were higher for coarse grains. 
Implications for the Midwest were evaluated by linking profit 
maximizing production area models to the 1988 prices and participation 
rates generated from the multimarket commodity model (summarized in 
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Table 5. Market prices for the baseline (45/0) and a targeting 
alternative, 5 million targeted acres in a 45-million-acre CRP 
(45/5) 
Wheat 
45/0 
45/5 
Corn 
45/0 
45/5 
Sorghum 
45/0 
45/5 
Oats 
45/0 
45/5 
Cottona 
45/0 
45/5 
Riceb 
45/0 
45/5 
Soybeans 
45/0 
45/5 
Change 
1988-91 from Percent 
1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 Average· Base Change 
2.56 
2.56 
1. 71 
1. 71 
1.60 
1.60 
1. 65 
1. 65 
2.86 
2.86 
1. 91 
1.92 
1. 74 
1. 74 
1. 46 
1. 47 
(Dollars per Bushel) 
3.00 
3.00 
2.00 
2.01 
1. 91 
1. 91 
1. 52 
1. 52 
3.05 
3.05 
2.05 
2.06 
2.04 
2.04 
1.60 
1.60 
3.09 
3.09 
2.11 
2.13 
2.03 
2.03 
1. 65 
1.66 
3.00 
3.00 0.00 0.0 
2.02 
2.03 0.01 0.6 
1. 93 
1.93 0.00 0.0 
1. 56 
1.56 0.00 0.3 
0.630 0.602 0.584 0.593 0.606 0.596 
0.628 0.597 0.575 0.582 0.594 0.587 0.009 -1.6 
6.96 
6.96 
5.63 
5.63 
5.91 
5.91 
6.14 
6.15 
6.18 
6.18 
5.23 
5. 25 
6.49 
6. 49 
5.24 
5.26 
6.59 
6.59 
5.79 
5.80 
6.29 
6.29 0.00 0.0 
5.60 
5.62 0.01 0.3 
SOURCE: "National and Regional Impacts of Targeting the Conservation 
Reserve." CARD Staff Report 89-SR 39, Center for Agricultural 
and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
aDollars per pound. 
bDollars per hundredweight. 
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Table 6. Comparison of the 45/5 alternative to the baseline (45/0), by 
production area 
Net income, crops 
Production 
Corn (bu.) 
Soybeans (bu.) 
Land use, corn 
Soybeans 
CRP 
CRP % of total land base 
Tillage 
Conventional 
Reduced till 
No till 
Pesticide use 
Alachlor 
Atrazine 
Land rental values 
Soil class one 
Soil class two 
CRP shadow price 
PA 39 
-0.2 
1.0 
-0.1 
0.9 
-0.2 
-2.5 
-2.4 
0.5 
o.o 
0.0 
1.0 
1.0 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.5 
PA 40 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.3 
0.0 
o. 1 
1.2 
1.1 
0.0 
-1.0 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.1 
0.4 
0.1 
-0.3 
PA 41 
(percent) 
-0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.6 
0.5 
-3.4 
-3.4 
0. 1 
1.6 
0.0 
0.3 
0.7 
-1.8 
-1.9 
-0.6 
PA 42 
0.2 
-1.8 
-1.0 
-2.0 
-1.4 
20.9 
21.0 
-0.3 
0.0 
-86.5 
-0.9 
-1.9 
1.8 
6.9 
4.5 
SOURCE: Frohberg et al. (1989). 
Note: PA 39 is in Minnesota 
PA 40 is in Wisconsin 
PA 41 is in Iowa 
Assumptions: 
PA 42 is central Illinois 
PA 43 is southern Illinois 
Price chg. from base 
Deficiency pmt. 
Set-aside rqmt. 
Corn Wheat 
+0.5% 0% 
$0.69 $0.95 
20% 10% 
PA 43 
-0.1 
-2.0 
-2.2 
-4.2 
-4.2 
10.0 
11.9 
0.6 
1.6 
0.0 
-1.9 
-l. 4 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.2 
Soy Hay 
+0.5% 0% 
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Table 5). These results are summarized in Table 6. These area-level 
models include highly specialized production activities identifying tillage 
practices, pesticide use, and so on. Results generated indicate that 
changes by production area were relatively small (Table 6). That is, net 
incomes from crops were relatively similar with and without the targeting 
of the conservation reserve. The major differences in input use related to 
the increased conservation reserve land that was idled as a result of 
targeting. 
For purposes of analysis, five production areas were identified along 
the upper Mississippi River basin (Fig. 4). Within that area, the 
targeting moved conservation reserve land from production areas 39 and 41 
(Minnesota and Iowa) to PA 40, 42, and 43 (Wisconsin, Central Illinois and 
Southern Illinois); this movement was related to the value of base acres in 
production. The land rental values, calculated using the shadow prices to 
the programming analysis, indicate that higher conservation reserve rental 
rates would be required in production area 42 as a result of the targeting. 
Generally, the results suggest that the targeting of conservation could 
occur with relatively minor adjustments to the agricultural sector, 
although the potential changes in crop production levels regionally imply 
significant local impacts. 
Corn Rootworm Insecticide Ban 
Heavy use of corn rootworm insecticides has evolved in the United 
States (CARD 1988). In Iowa for example, about 35 percent of the planted 
acres are treated with corn rootworm insecticides (Table 7). And, the 
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Figure 4. The five producing areas of the upper Mississippi basin area 
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Table 7. Acres of Iowa corn treated with soil insecticides for corn 
rootworm larval control, 1985 
Insecticide 
Use 
Broot 
Counter 
Dyfonate 
Furadan 
Lorsban 
Mocap 
Thimet 
Other 
Total treated 
Total planted 
Percent acres 
treated 
Acres Corn 
Following Corn 
51,000 
1,452,000 
831,000 
366,000 
1,032,000 
18,000 
606,000 
3,000 
4,359,000 
5,560,000 
78% 
SOURCE: Table 21, "Pesticide 
PM 1288, Cooperative 
Acres Corn 
Following Soybeans 
0 
152,000 
75,000 
5,000 
233,000 
0 
30,000 
0 
495,000 
7,367,000 
6.7% 
Acres Corn 
Following 
Other Crops 
0 
38,000 
26,000 
8,000 
57,000 
0 
20,000 
0 
149,000 
973,000 
15.3% 
Total 
Acres 
Treated 
Sl, 000 
1,642,000 
932,0CO 
379,000 
1,322,000 
18,000 
656,000 
3,000 
5,003,000 
13.900.000 
35.99% 
Used in Iowa Crop Production in 1985." ISU 
Extension Service, January 1987. 
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active chemicals used in treating for corn rootworms are substantial 
(Table 8) . The policy simulated was for a ban of corn rootworm 
insecticides. Interest in this policy was stimulated by information on 
environmental loading of agricultural chemicals. However, the half-lives 
of the active ingredients in corn rootworm insecticides are relatively 
short, so the implied environmental enhancement associated with a ban could 
be relatively low. 
Analysis. The CEEPES system described for the policy exercise on 
targeting land for the conservation reserve was applied for this analysis. 
Calibration of CEEPES was identical to that used for the buffer strip 
evaluation. In addition to the agricultural decision component, the 
biogeophysical component of CEEPES was exercised for this analysis. In 
particular, plant growth models and soil root zone models were applied to 
estimate impacts of reduced weed control on yields and the fate or 
transport of different corn rootworm chemicals. 
Effects of the ban were evaluated using national commodity market 
models, production region models, and farm-level models. The farm-level 
and region-level models incorporated acreage bases and more of the 
specifics of the current agricultural commodity programs. At the farm 
level, the corn base acreage was a critical factor in determining the 
economic impact of the ban. The production region and farm-level models 
were used to evaluate economic values of base acres lost when producers 
decide not to grow corn at the levels required to maintain the corn base. 
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Table 8. Surrnnary of corn rootworm insecticide use in Iowa, 1985 
Acres Pounds 
Treated Percent Active Percent 
Insecticide (000) Distribution Ingredient Distribution 
Broot lSGX 51 0.9 62,662 1.0 
Counter lSG 1,642 29.8 2,048,395 32.8 
Dyfonate 20G 900 16.3 1,122,433 18.0 
Dyfonate 4EC 32 0.6 39,901 0.6 
Furadan lSG 364 6.6 453,636 7. 3 
Furadan 4F 15 0.3 18,679 0.3 
Lorsban lSG 1,282 23.3 1,598,804 25.6 
Lorsban 4E 40 0.7 50,250 0.8 
Mocap 18 0.3 22,537 0.4 
Thirnet 20G 656 11.9 819,001 13. 1 
Other S05a 9.2 
Total 5,505 100 6,237,298 100 
SOURCE: Table 23, "Pesticide Used in Iowa Crop Production in 1985." ISU 
PM 1288, Cooperative Extension Service, January 1987. 
achanged from 5,000 in original table to 505,000 here so that column adds 
to 5,505,000. 
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This decision would be in response to the likelihood of corn rootworm 
infestation of continuous corn rotations. 
Results. Findings from the biogeophysical components of CEEPES 
indicated that surface water was at greater contemporary risk than 
groundwater from contamination through use of corn rootworm insecticides. 
Surface water contamination resulted from insecticide runoff and from tile 
discharge. Results of the analysis with the root zone models showed that 
carbofuran (furadan) and ethoprop (mocap) exhibited potential to leach into 
shallow aquifers. This was especially true for soils of coarse texture. 
Generally, those insecticides with longer half-lives and low soil 
absorptive properties were more likely to enter ground- and surface water. 
The root zone model analysis results indicate that a total ban would be 
unnecessary to eliminate the presence of compounds in groundwater. 
Targeting of areas with high potential leaching due to soil resource 
characteristics, along with restricting the use of selected insecticide 
compounds, could be sufficient for significantly reducing potential 
contamination by corn rootworm insecticides (Table 9). 
An erosion productivity calculator was used for evaluating yield 
reductions caused by heavy rootworm infestations. Generally, the results 
showed that the yield responses to infestation were highly related to the 
rainfall pattern during the year. In wet years, modest infestations of 
rootworms had relatively small impacts, because the rainfall afforded an 
opportunity for regrowth of the corn root systems. 
Table 9. Simulated yearly average concentrations of seven insecticides (parts per billion) 
Soil and 
Insecticide 
Plainfield 
Terbufos 
Carbo fur an 
Chlorphrifos 
Fonofos 
Trimethacarb 
Ethoprop 
Phorate 
Tama 
Terbufos 
Carbofuran 
Chlorpyrifos 
Fonofos 
Trimethacarb 
Ethoprop 
Phorate 
Volatilization 
Runoff (ppb) 
Dry 
0.00 
149.53 
.01 
0.00 
11.41 
218.25 
0.00 
0.00 
190.07 
0.02 
0.00 
11.09 
205.79 
0.00 
Normal Wet 
0,00 
18.40 
0,00 
0.00 
2.18 
49.74 
0,00 
0,00 
70.31 
0.01 
0.00 
5.71 
112. 14 
0.00 
0.00 
11.46 
0.00 
0.00 
1.08 
17. 15 
0.00 
0.00 
14.65 
0.00 
0.00 
1.26 
20.79 
0.00 
Leaching (ppb) 
Dry 
0.00 
1. 03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.78 
0.00 
0.00 
0.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
Normal Wet 
0.00 
41.55 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
29.57 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.93 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
SOURCE: Pesticide root zone model results. CARD 1988. 
Nonvolatilization 
Runoff (ppb) 
Dry 
27.69 
340.92 
6.27 
76.79 
162.56 
408.44 
8. 72 
25.46 
440.14 
5.63 
68.82 
145.89 
383.22 
8.57 
Normal Wet 
7.82 
49.94 
3. 28 
31.22 
68.76 
105.91 
1.59 
16.73 
173.43 
4.97 
54.45 
113.20 
222.68 
4.32 
3.01 
22.85 
2.80 
19.35 
41.19 
36.05 
0.84 
3.48 
30.76 
2.84 
20.44 
43.85 
45.47 
0.97 
Leaching (ppb) 
Dry Normal Wet 
0.00 
1.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
70.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1. 22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
51.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
13.91 
0.00 
0.00 
1. 74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
Note: Simulations involved three weather scenarios (dry, normal, wet) based on weather data for Kossuth 
County, Iowa, and two soils: Plainfield (coarse texture) and Tam\ (fine texture). Application 
rate= 1.12 kg/ha; plant uptake efficiency= 100%. 
w 
w 
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These results for yield impacts were incorporated in state-level, 
profit maximizing models. Generally, the results from the state-level 
models indicated that the economic impacts of the ban on corn rootworm 
insecticides would be relatively small. The most notable behavioral 
response was a shift away from rotations with corn following corn. Prior 
to the insecticide ban, more than 30 percent of the corn grown in the 
five-state upper Mississippi River basin area was planted to continuous 
corn. After the insecticide ban, this figure was reduced to 5.9 percent 
and 5.2 percent under heavy and light infestation assumptions, 
respectively. In the five-state area, total corn acreage was, however, 
reduced only by 1 to 2 percent depending on the corn rootworm infestation 
level assumed. Generally, the production adjustments were to move to corn 
and soybean rotations instead of rotations where corn followed corn. 
The reductions in net farm income, shown in Figure 5, result from the 
use of lower-quality land and more extensive rotations. These income 
reductions were relatively low. Nitrogen application levels also declined 
as more legumes were added to rotations. There were significant reductions 
in the use of broadleaf and grass herbicides for corn production, but 
herbicides associated with soybean production increased. 
The conclusion from the analysis was that if base acreage provisions 
for the commodity programs were more flexible and paired with limitations 
in the use of corn rootworm insecticides, the result would be minor changes 
in ~rapping patterns and in net farm income, along with significant 
reductions in the use of corn rootworm insecticides. Major economic 
impacts were for farms with very large corn bases relative to total 
Figure 5. Net farm 1ncome by state 
State 
Illinois 
Iowa 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Wisconsin 
4033 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4008 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.3986 
1128 
~~~~~ 1128 
~~~~~ 1127 
0 
889 
1 
6 
1000 2000 3000 4000 
Thousands of Dollars 
-Baseline ~Light Attack D Heavy Attack 
Source: CARD, 1988 
5000 
'------------------------ ------- ... ----------- ---------- .. ------ ------- -------- ------- --------- - --------
w 
V• 
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acreage. The corn rootworm insecticide ban would force these farmers to 
move to corn/soybean rotations, loosing substantial corn acreage base. 
Base flexibility as a feature policy would leave these farmers in 
relatively similar economic positions and would significantly reduce 
applications of corn rootworm insecticides. This exercise suggested the 
importance of "packaging" environmentally motivated policies directed at 
agriculture with agriculture price and income stabilization policies. This 
packaging, if carefully designed, could result in significantly improved 
agricultural incomes/environmental trade-offs. 
Observations 
Results from four environmental/agricultural policy exercises provided 
useful insights. Generally, these analyses showed that environmentally 
motivated changes in agricultural production patterns and practices could 
be accommodated in U.S. agriculture with relatively modest increases 
in production costs. Also, regional adjustments associated with these 
policies appeared to be relatively minor. Setting aside the question of 
the responsibility for the increased costs, the results indicated 
considerable opportunity for bringing agricultural price and income 
stabilization policy mechanisms and environmental policy into closer 
harmony--especially for the agricultural supply/demand situation as 
reflected in 1988 prior to the drought. 
The frailty of policies that tie environmental and agricultural 
instruments was highlighted by comparing the baseline prices and 
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performance variables for agriculture from the selected evaluations to the 
current agricultural situation. Clearly, the outcomes for these tied 
policies are highly conditioned by the market situation for agriculture 
and, of course, the agricultural policy framework. The illustrative 
evaluations were all conducted in early 1988, prior to the drought. The 
high stocks of major program commodities on hand at that time suggested 
continuation of significant acreage reduction programs. Of course, the 
situation has changed significantly. However, for the 1989 baseline 
conditioned by the 1988 drought (FAPRI 1989), acreage reductions were lower 
and market prices were higher, and government costs of the agricultural 
programs were reduced. A reevaluation of the consequences of the 
environmentally motivated policies selected for inclusion in this 
discussion would be quite different under the current circumstances in 
domestic and world agricultural markets. In general, the policies could be 
accommodated, but there would be higher opportunity costs for farm income 
and increased changes in interregional production patterns. 
The general conclusion from these policy exercises and observations 
thus is mixed. Opportunities exist and probably will continue to exist 
for improving coordination of agricultural and environmental/chemical 
policies. Generally, to facilitate improved harmonization, agricultural 
and chemical/environmental policies will require flexibility and the 
continual tuning of a fairly complex set of instruments. These adjustments 
in the policy instruments and the potential benefits from harmonization are 
highly dependent on forces outside the control of the policymakers--for 
example, weather. 
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The argument, then, is for flexible policies and a recognition that 
the settings of the instruments for policymaking will require adjustment as 
the factors conditioning agriculture and the environment change. Whether 
these types of policies are achievable in the current institutional setting 
is a subject for continued study and debate. The alternative is more blunt 
policy instruments, which implies more significant income and production 
impacts for the agricultural sector to achieve targeted environmental 
performance standards, and of course, more serious questions about the 
responsibility for the associated economic adjustments. 
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